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Between Fragmentation and Dialogue. Twitter Communities and Political 
Debate about the Swiss ‘Nuclear Withdrawal Initiative’ 
 
1. Introduction 
The emergence, use, and, in recent years, withdrawal from nuclear energy have stirred 
political controversies in numerous countries worldwide. These controversies have involved 
politicians, industry representatives, scientists, environmental organizations, and the wider 
public. Arguments promoting or criticizing nuclear energy ranged from the security of the 
energy supply over the technology’s cost-effectiveness to concerns about global warming, 
health risks and terror threats.  
Switzerland has witnessed similar debates in the past and is a particularly interesting case for 
analysis because it features a strong direct democracy that has given its citizens a direct say 
on the use of nuclear energy (Vatter, 2009). Since five nuclear power plants were 
commissioned in Switzerland between 1969 and 1984, several referenda were held on nuclear 
energy. In 1979 and 1984, initiatives aiming to prevent the construction of new nuclear plants 
were rejected. In 1990, following the Chernobyl accident, 55% of Swiss voters accepted a 
moratorium on the construction of further nuclear plants, although 53% were against a general 
withdrawal from the technology.1 In 2003, the Swiss opted to lift the moratorium and new 
plants were discussed when the Fukushima accident occurred in March 2011. Immediately, 
Federal Councilor Doris Leuthard halted discussions about new plants, and, two months later, 
the Federal Council opted for a long-term phase-out according to which existing power plants 
will not be replaced after their operating periods end between 2019 and 2034 
(Handelszeitung, 2011, May 25).  
Since then, the focus of the Swiss political and public debate has shifted from whether to 
phase out nuclear power to the terms and timeline of such a phase-out. In 2015, the Swiss 
Green Party initiated the “Nuclear Withdrawal Initiative”, targeting a rapid phase-out and a 
cut in the existing plants’ operating times from 50 to 45 years. On November 2016, however, 
54% of the electorate voted against the initiative - a surprising result, as experts and early 
                                                            
1 All results on referenda on nuclear energy (18.02.1979, 23.09.1984, 23.09.1990, 18.05.2003, 27.11.2016) 
retrieved from https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/vab_2_2_4_1.html by day of each referendum [19.04.2017]. 
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polls had indicated a majority of the Swiss in favor of the initiative (Tagesanzeiger, 2016, 
October 21).  
The debate in the run-up of the referendum was heated, particularly along two major 
cleavages: First, there was an ideological polarization. On the one side, the Green Party, the 
Social Democrats, the Green Liberal Party, civil society actors, and some experts positioned 
themselves as advocates for the initiative, while on the other hand, the Federal Council, the 
conservative People’s Party, the Christian Democrats and the Liberals opposed it (fög, 2016). 
Second, there were strong regional differences. While support for the initiative was stronger 
in the French-speaking part of Switzerland, the German-speaking regions were more critical 
(fög, 2016).  
In the article at hand, we analyze this debate, its characteristics and its development. We do so 
by analyzing social media, or more specifically, Twitter communication, as Twitter has 
become an important instrument for stakeholders’ efforts to strategically disseminate their 
positions directly to the public, and to influence the agenda of legacy media (e.g., Broersma & 
Graham, 2012; Ceron, Curini, & Iacus, 2016; Metag & Rauchfleisch, 2017). And due to its 
pre-existing infrastructure and low cost, it “has become an important platform for eloquent 
and media-savvy people outside the traditional political, economic, or academic elites” 
(Rogstad, 2016, p. 142). We explore how Twitter communication surrounding the Nuclear 
Withdrawal Initiative was structured and to what extent it was polarized or enabled discussion 
between different camps. By doing so this paper contributes to previous research as it 
contradicts findings on a strong polarization on social media, but shows that there is 
substantial discussion regarding the controversial initiative both between and within different 
communities.  
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
Over the past decades, political scientists, sociologists, communication scholars and 
movement researchers, among others, have examined public debates about nuclear power, 
usually focusing either on stakeholders such as environmental NGOs or corporations, or on 
legacy media coverage in North America or Western European countries. They have 
analyzed, for example, which frames were used to portray nuclear power in US media 
between 1945 and 1986 (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989), how nuclear energy was strategically 
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reframed in the UK between 2005 and 2008 (Doyle, 2011), or how Fukushima has been 
instrumentalized in the media coverage across countries (Kepplinger & Lemke, 2016). 
Overall, however, the scholarship on public and media debates concerning nuclear power 
exhibits three desiderata that we want to tackle with our study.  
2.1 Public Debates about Political Decisions: Shifting Away from the Analysis of Nuclear 
Accidents  
A significant number of studies have investigated the public discourse concerning nuclear 
power through the conceptual lens of risk and crisis communication, mainly focusing on the 
accidents on Three Mile Island in 1979 (e.g., Friedman, 1981; Stephens & Edison, 1982), in 
Chernobyl in 1986 (e.g., Friedman, Gorney, & Egolf, 1992; Gale, 1987), and in Fukushima in 
2011 (e.g., Binder, 2012; Kepplinger & Lemke, 2016; Li et al., 2016). Accordingly, many of 
them have limited themselves to an analysis of communication immediately after those 
events.  
In contrast, studies analyzing nuclear energy debates as political debates, and against the 
background of national energy and climate policies, are rare. This is particularly problematic 
because the politics of nuclear energy have recently been debated in many countries as part of 
larger energy debates (e.g., Bickerstaff, Lorenzoni, Pidgeon, Poortinga, & Simmons, 2008), 
and as decisions surrounding (nuclear) energy policy are important.  
The few existing analyses of media coverage about the building of new nuclear power plants, 
about the extension of existing plants’ operating periods, or about the withdrawal of nuclear 
power have shown that such political debates about nuclear energy differ from times of 
accidents. During accidents and in their immediate aftermath, a “risk attention cycle” pattern 
appears which shifts debate away from political aspects and towards more immediate 
considerations of rescue missions, damages, victims and attributions of guilt (e.g. Kristiansen, 
2017). In contrast, debates focusing on political decisions about nuclear energy focus on 
longer-term issues. Studies examining such periods found, for example, that nuclear power 
was framed as an instrument to combat climate change in the UK in an effort to legitimize 
new nuclear plants (Doyle, 2011; Teräväinen, 2011; Teräväinen, Lehtonen, & Martiskainen, 
2011), or that the stability of energy supply and national energy independence were used as 
arguments in favor of extending the German plants’ operating time (Arlt, 2013) and the 
building of new ones in other countries (Doyle, 2011; Teräväinen, 2011; Ylönen, Litmanen, 
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Kojo, & Lindell, 2017). Likely, public debate in the wake of the Swiss referendum would also 
center on long-term issues and objectives (e.g., the reduction of the proportion of fossil-based 
energy use, the expansion of the use of renewable energies, and intensification of energy 
efficiency) anchored in the Swiss National Energy Strategy 2050; which was finally accepted 
by 58% of the Swiss voters in a referendum held in May 2017. 
2.2 Analyzing Social Media 
Scholarship so far has largely focused on legacy news media and disregarded the growing 
relevance of social media in public debates concerning nuclear power. The vast majority of 
studies, even recent ones (e.g., Arlt & Wolling, 2016; Kepplinger & Lemke, 2016; 
Kristiansen, 2017; Teräväinen, 2011; Ylönen et al., 2017), examine public debates on nuclear 
energy by analyzing traditional news media such as television and newspapers.  
Analyzing social media to complement these studies, however, is paramount. First, social 
media have generally become an important source of information for people in industrial 
countries around the world, including in Switzerland (e.g., Reuters Institute Digital News 
Report 2017). Second, they exhibit structural features which enable a different kind of 
communication. The open and interactive nature of online media provides “new opportunities 
for bottom-up communication, for the expression of public preferences, for participation in 
policy making, and for holding political actors accountable” and has “created new 
opportunities for countering the traditional top-down communication of existing print and 
broadcast media” (Esser, 2013, p. 173). As a result, stakeholders find a playing field online 
and in social media that differs from legacy media (e.g., Gavin, 2010, p. 461). Civil society 
groups and environmental NGOs in particular are very active in political debate around 
nuclear energy, but are often “weak” in terms of resources and have “fewer opportunities than 
established actors to gain a voice in traditional media” (Pfetsch & Adam 2013, p. 34). These 
groups may particularly benefit from the cost-effective communication enabled by social 
media, and as a result, a broader and more varied spectrum of stakeholders and political 
positions may be visible online. This importance of social media in debates around nuclear 
power, however, is not mirrored in scholarship. Only two studies have examined Twitter 
debate surrounding the Fukushima accident (Binder, 2012; Li et al., 2016), and one has 
examined how online resources were used in news media coverage in order to provide better 
information on the incident (Friedman, 2011). But again, these studies employ a risk and 
crisis communication perspective and do not focus on political decisions.  
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As a result, current scholarship is not yet able to assess whether the potential of social media 
to enable more pluralistic political debates around nuclear energy has been realized. Empirical 
evidence is missing which would allow scholars to assess the two competing conceptual 
perspectives existing on this question: On the one hand, some scholars fear that social media 
may function as “echo chambers” that facilitate networks among people who are similar to 
each other, have similar views and/or live in similar situations (e.g. McPherson, Smith-Lovin, 
& Cook, 2001). In social media, such homophily has mostly been studied in terms of shared 
ideological and political beliefs (Colleoni, Rozza, & Arvidsson, 2014; Garrett, 2009), and it 
has been argued that an increase in ideologically homogeneous communities on social media 
may lead to more intense, and problematic, political polarization and fragmentation of the 
public along ideological lines (Sunstein, 2009). Research supporting this perspective has 
found that social media communication, especially regarding controversial scientific and 
political issues, can exhibit “little conversation between [different] groups despite the fact that 
they are focused on the same topic. Polarized Crowds [..] are not arguing. They are ignoring 
one another” (Smith, Rainie, Shneiderman, & Himelboim, 2014, p. 2). Many of these studies, 
however, stem from Angloamerican countries. Jang and Hart (2015), for example, found that 
US debates about climate change on Twitter were strongly polarized between climate change 
believers and sceptics, and Williams, McMurray, Kurz, and Lambert (2015) came to similar 
results. Moreover, various studies have shown that Twitter (e.g., Barberá, Jost, Nagler, 
Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015; Himelboim, McCreery, Smith, 2013; Hong & Kim, 2015) and 
blog (e.g., Gilbert, Bergstrom, & Karahalios, 2009; Lawrence, Sides, & Farrell, 2010) 
communication is structured along political lines, and that users often interact within 
politically homogeneous clusters and are exposed to like-minded content. However, 
communication can also be structured along socialcultural lines (e.g., Rauchfleisch & Metag, 
2016). Therefore, scholars gave posited that the social media may hinder than contribute to 
diverse and open debates.  
This pessimistic perspective is contradicted, however, by scholars arguing that social media 
can also provide citizens with a wide range of ideologically different views, and may 
therefore enable interactions across ideological positions (Mutz & Mondak, 2006). Kim 
(2011), for example, demonstrated that social network sites expose individuals to challenging 
and thus cross-cutting political views. Similarly, Fletcher and Nielsen (2017) found that social 
media users consume news from more sources than non-users and, even more importantly, 
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that they “have a more politically diverse online news diet than those who do not use social 
media”.  
Apart from studies those findings clearly support either the pessimistic or the optimistic 
position, there are also empirical results located between them which explored both “a 
clustering effect around shared political views among supporters of the same party” as well as 
“cross-ideological connections and exchanges, which may facilitate open, cross-party, and 
cross-ideological discourse” (Gruzd & Roy, 2014, p. 28; see also Barberá et al., 2015).  
In sum, findings on the role of social media in political debates are mixed. While some studies 
confirm the pessimistic perspective showing that social media sites seem to facilitate 
segregation along ideological or sociocultural lines and thus a “non-debate” between groups 
holding opposing views, others support the optimistic perspective providing evidence that 
social media enable interactions between different people and thus support pluralistic debates.  
 
2.3 Focusing on the Swiss Case 
The third desideratum concerns the geographical focus of existing studies. Most studies 
analyzing polarization on social media have analyzed English-language and, more 
specifically, US data – also those focusing on debates around nuclear energy. In other words, 
they have focused on a country with a polarized political system in which power is divided 
between two main parties. Unless other countries are analyzed, the extent to which this 
structural and sociocultural polarization influences the polarization of social media debates 
remains unclear. Therefore, these analyses need to be supplemented by studies of structurally 
different cases. Switzerland represents an excellent test case for such a “most different” 
comparison. The country has been classified as a relatively pure consensus democracy 
(Lijphart, 2012, p. 7) in which the various parties in a multi-party system share executive 
power and have to find common ground on political issues (Lijphart, 2012, p. 33). Swiss 
political debates are usually not strongly polarized and disconnected between two ideological 
camps, but rather dialogical and consensus-oriented, as representatives from various political 
parties have to exchange positions and arguments to reach a common decision. Another 
argument to analyze social media debates in Switzerland is the country’s emphasis on direct-
democratic instruments. In Germany (e.g., Arlt, 2013) and the UK (e.g., Doyle, 2011), 
decisions about the runtime or building of nuclear plants were taken on the national political 
level, with public discourse being less influential for these decisions. Switzerland, in contrast, 
allows for the direct participation of the population in political decision making (Vatter, 
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2009). Therefore, public discourse prior to referenda is highly relevant, since it may directly 
affect the outcome of referenda and have meaningful consequences for the future of Swiss 
energy policy.  
2.4 Research Questions  
The present paper addresses these three desiderata by exploring the political debate on Twitter 
concerning the Swiss Nuclear Withdrawal Initiative. It aims to assess the diversity of Twitter 
communication, its content and its fragmentation. Accordingly, it poses the following 
research questions:  
RQ1:  Which follower communities take part in the Twitter debate surrounding the Nuclear 
Withdrawal Initiative, and how can they be characterized in terms of their ideology, 
location, size and position towards the Initiative?  
RQ2: How do these communities communicate, i.e. to what extent and with what content do 
they communicate? 
RQ3:  How pronounced is the fragmentation or polarization of the debate, i.e. to what extent 
are disconnected echo chambers or interactions across communities visible?  
3. Data Collection and Network Description 
To answer the research questions, we collected tweets on the Nuclear Withdrawal Initiative 
using keywords and hashtags related to the initiative in particular and to Swiss politics in 
general. We used German, French, and Italian keywords and hashtags to also cover the debate 
in the country’s non-German-speaking regions. The keywords and hashtags were tracked on 
the Twitter stream API from November 2 to November 30, 2016; these four weeks cover the 
hot phase of the campaign before the voting day. As we also monitored general hashtags (e.g., 
#chvote), the final data set was filtered based on a list of issue-specific hashtags and 
keywords.2 The final data set consisted of approximately 3000 unique users.3 For all of them, 
                                                            
2 We used the following issue-specific hashtags: “#aai”, “#aai_nein”, “#aai_ja”, “#AAI2029”, 
“#AAI2017”, “#AtomausstiegJa”, “#AtomausstiegNein”, “#Ausstiegsinitiative”, “#uscitadalnucleare”, “#sortiedunucleaire”, 
and “Ausstiegsinitiative”. Addiditonally we considered tweets in which the French and Italian keywords “nuclaire” and 
“nucleari” appeared together with the general hastag #chvote for votes in Switzerland.  
3 In Switzerland Twitter is mainly an elite network (Rauchfleisch & Metag, 2016) whicthat has far less monthly active users 
than Facebook (Kovic et al., 2017). 
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we downloaded the list of Twitter accounts they were following in order to create a follower 
network. After cleansing4 the data, the final network consisted of 2761 unique users who 
wrote 12,141 issue-related tweets (7998 [66%] retweets, 3312 [27%] normal tweets, and 831 
[7%] replies). The network has a density of 0.014, which means that 1.4 percent of all 
possible connections actually exist within the network. The average path length, which serves 
as an indicator of the average number of jumps along the straightest paths for all possible user 
pairs in the network, is 2.94 and, therefore, the network can clearly be described as a “small-
world” network. However, there is a visible gap between the German-speaking communities 
on the one hand and the French- and Italian-speaking community on the other. Geography and 
language seem to be stronger separators than political distance (see also Rauchfleisch & 
Metag, 2016). All analyses and visualizations were created in the R programming 
environment and using the open-source software Gephi. 
4. Results 
4.1 Follower Communities in the Twitter Debate and their Characteristics  
To identify and characterize the follower communities taking part in the Twitter debate 
surrounding the Nuclear Withdrawal Initiative, we reconstructed a follower network for all 
users who posted at least one tweet or retweet containing a relevant keyword or hashtag. 
Using the Louvain algorithm for community detection (Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte, & 
Lefebvre, 2008)5, we identified seven distinct communities, which vary in size, composition, 
actor structure, ideological position, and opinion regarding the initiative (see Table 1).6 These 
communities can be understood as “subgroups in a network in which nodes are substantially 
more connected to one another than to nodes outside that subgroup” (Himelboim, McCreery, 
& Smith, 2013, p. 159). One basic factor that affects membership of a certain group is 
homophily, since people are more likely to be embedded in homogeneous groups with regard 
                                                            
4 In this network, we identified a group of Indian users who used the same hashtag as that for the referendum (#aai), but for a 
different purpose unrelated to the vote. We removed those users, as well as a few very small groups of users (mostly single 
bots that picked up a hashtag) who were not connected to the general Swiss Twitter population. 
5 Even though we have a densely connected follower network, we could identify meaningful structures with a modularity 
score above .3 (see also Newman, 2004).  
6 The density is an indicator of the degree of dyadic connections existing within a community. In our case, the density is the 
ratio of the number of connections that actually exist in the community dividing it by the total number of ties. The E-I index 
ranges from -1 (if all ties are internal) to +1 (if all ties are external). We also calculated the share of “yes” (ja) and “no” (nein) 
in the tweets of each community. For the Italian and French community, we used si, oui, non, and no. The percentage shows 
how many tweets have a yes out of all tweets mentioning either no or yes.divided by the number of all possible connections. 
The average path length provides information on the average number of steps it will take a community member to interact 
with a complete stranger/someone outside the community along the shortest path. The E-I (external-internal) index 
(Krackhardt & Stern, 1988) compares the number of ties within communities and between communities by subtracting the 
number of ties to internal community members from the number of ties to external people outside the community, and  
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to personal, political, or behavioral traits (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). In first 
step, we compared our network to a “baseline” random graph with the same properties 
(Erdős-Rényi model; Erdős & Rény, 1959). We then compared the clustering coefficient 
mean distance, and degree of separation (see Kaiser, 2017). We created 100 random graphs 
and report the average score. The follower network has a considerably larger clustering 
coefficient (.234) than the random graphs (M=.028, SD=.0001). The average path length 
(2.94) is also considerably greater than in the random graphs (M=2.55, SD=.002). The degree 
of separation (Hu, Thulasiraman, and Verma, 2013) (128.48) is substantially larger than in the 
random graphs (M=.97, SD=.11).7   
• The “Conservative Mainstream” community is the largest community (n=784). It 
holds a central position in the overall network, with almost all the other communities 
positioned around it (see Figure 1 in the Appendix). The community is the voice of the 
middle-class, conservative mainstream of German-speaking Switzerland, who 
generally oppose the Nuclear Withdrawal Initiative. Given that among the most 
relevant users, based on the number of direct connections, are various media outlets 
such as the NZZ, a conservative quality broadsheet, and the large German-language 
public-service broadcaster, SRF, this community is likely to have a considerable 
impact on the political debate on Twitter and beyond. The community has a 
comparatively low density of 0.036 and an average path length of 2.55. The 
community clearly opposes the initiative with a share of 81% “no”. 
• The major – and also quite large – counterpart of the Conservative Mainstream is the 
“Green-Left” community. It is the second largest community (n=621), representing the 
environmental and liberal camps of German-speaking Switzerland, and it contains 
various representatives of the Green Party, who initiated the Nuclear Withdrawal 
Initiative. The density of this community is 0.051 and the average path length is 2.38. 
This community clearly supports the initiative with a share of 87% “yes”. 
• The “Energy-Environmentalist” community, with a density of 0.024 and an average 
path length of 3.38, mainly consists of actors concerned with energy and 
environmental issues in general. Among the most relevant users are the Federal 
Department of Environment, Transport, Energy, and Communications, as well as 
                                                            
7 If the 4 nodes with the highest betweenness centrality are excluded (mostly media), the polarization score is still 
substantially larger (57.60) than the score of the random network. 
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environmental organizations such as the WWF and Greenpeace, who clearly 
positioned themselves as supports of the initiative.  
• In contrast, the “Pro-Nuclear-Power” community comprises a small group of issue-
specific experts and pro-nuclear lobbyists who function as campaigners for nuclear 
energy and who thus oppose the initiative. One notable community member is the 
Energy for Humanity Foundation, a scientific-technical organization, which explicably 
aims to increase the acceptance of nuclear power among the public. The community 
has a density of 0.078 and an average path length of 2.49. Moreover, this community 
has a comparatively significantly negative E-I ratio of -0.46, which means that the 
community has far more internal than external ties and is therefore rather isolated from 
the other communities.  
• The “Basle Region” community mainly consists of politicians from the Basle region, 
most likely because Basle historically positioned itself against nuclear power, and thus 
this community clearly supports the initiative. The community has a comparatively 
high density of 0.179 and an average path length of 1.92, which means that it takes 
members only about two steps to interact with members from other communities.  
• The top users of the “Green-Liberal” community are mainly representatives of the 
Green-Liberal Party, which positioned itself as a supporter of the initiative. The 
community has a comparatively high density of 0.223, which means that 22.3 percent 
of all possible connections within the community actual existing. The average path 
length is 1.96.  
• Finally, there is the “French- and Italian-Speaking” community, with a density of 
0.032 and an average path length of 3.04, which represents political opinion leaders in 
the non-German-speaking parts of Switzerland, including Roger Nordmann and Adèle 
Thorens Goumaz, who are both representatives of the Canton of Vaud in the National 
Council of Switzerland. Although the French-speaking region of Switzerland 
supported the initiative (fög, 2016), there is a visible gap between the German-
speaking communities and the non-German-speaking community, which means that 
language in terms of a sociocultural factor is a stronger separator than position 
regarding the initiative. Additionally, the negative E-I ratio of -0.36 indicates that the 
French- and Italian-speaking community is rather isolated from the other communities 
(see Table 1).  
 
11 
 
 
Insert here  
Table 1  
Communities involved in the political debate on Twitter and their characterization  
 
4.2 Intensity and Content of Twitter Communication  
Over time, the Twitter communication concerning the Nuclear Withdrawal Initiative showed 
a slow increase typical for a pre-announced event (Lehmann et al., 2012). Within this 
timeline, three dates exhibit an increased level of communication. The first peak occurs on 
November 16, 2016, one day after the second SRG poll, which revealed the tight race 
between supporters and opponents, was published (gfs.bern, 2016, November 15). Both users 
and the media responded to this survey on Twitter, using it as an occasion to stress their 
arguments and further mobilize their supporters. The second, smaller peak occurred on 
November 21, 2016, one week prior to the vote, when Twitter was used for a final 
mobilization push. The third, sharp increase occurred on November 27, 2016, the day of the 
actual referendum, when the final mobilizations were made and the results discussed. As is 
typical for such an event, activity falls rapidly after the vote (Lehmann et al., 2012).   
Insert here  
Figure 2. Distribution of tweets per day and discourse community over time 
Regarding the communicating activity of the identified communities, Figure 2 presents the 
distribution of their tweets per day and discourse community over time. The “Conservative 
Mainstream” and “Green-Left” communities provided the highest levels of daily activity in 
the Twitter debate, although their activity was proportionate to their overall size within the 
network (29% and 24%, respectively; see Table 1). Still, however, these communities are the 
ones most responsible for shaping the political debate in preparation for the referendum.  
In addition, the “Energy-Environmental” community also generated a lot of activity and it 
was, in relation to its size, comparatively active in contributing to the debate on Twitter. In 
contrast, the “Pro-Nuclear-Power” community, which was rather small to begin with, was 
relatively inactive in comparison to its size, and it was accordingly less able to shape the 
debate. The other, smaller communities were represented rather weakly but still proportional 
to their size. The “French- and Italian-Speaking” community, in contrast, was proportionately 
under-represented on Twitter, with an average share of the daily total tweet volume of only 
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14%, which was also rather isolated from the other communities. This community’s effect on 
the political debate was, therefore, likely limited, particularly in the German-speaking part of 
Switzerland where, in the end, the referendum was clearly rejected (Tagesanzeiger, 2016, 
November 27). 
In addition to the (relative) activity of the different Twitter communities, the content of the 
communication of opponents and supporters of the Nuclear Withdrawal Initiative was 
assessed. Firstly, we grouped the communities into those opposing the referendum (i.e., the 
“Conservative Mainstream” and “Pro-Nuclear-Power” communities) and those supporting it 
(the “Green-Left”, “Energy-Environmental”, “Basle Region”, and “Green-Liberal” 
communities) (see Table 1).8 Secondly, we created two corpora (n=4383 tweets for the 
opponents and n=5986 tweets for the supporters) in order to examine similarities and 
differences in the over-representation of certain, meaningful words in the tweets of opponents 
and supporters. Thirdly, we cleaned each corpus (removing punctuation and non-graphic 
characters, changing all letters to lower case, etc.) and stemmed the words, thereby reducing 
the words to their base form. We did not remove numbers, since they are relevant in our case 
(e.g., providing information on dates and years). Fourthly, we calculated the total frequency 
of words as well as the relative frequency of words in each corpus. We then could divide for 
each word its relative frequency in the supporters’ corpus by its relative frequency in the 
opponents’ corpus in order to estimate the degree to which a given word was over-represented 
among the tweets of opponents or supporters. Finally, we log-transformed the score. A score 
of 0 indicates that a word is equally represented in each corpus, whereas a negative value 
indicates an over-representation in the tweets of opponents and a positive value indicates an 
over-representation in the tweets of supporters. In addition, we calculated the Chi-square for 
each word as an indicator, which words are not evenly distributed over the corpuses, and 
selected the 60 most frequently used words as well as the 60 words with the highest Chi-
square values. As some of the most frequently used words also had one of the highest Chi-
square scores, the visualization contains 92 unique words (see Figure 3). 
Insert here  
Figure 3. Over-representation of keywords used by opponents and supporters (the over-
representation was normalized through a division by the absolute maximum number. The size of the words in the 
                                                            
8 The “French- and Italian-Speaking” community was excluded for this analysis due to the difference in 
language. 
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figure indicates the overall frequency of each word in both corpuses. The color and position show the degree of 
over-representation by each camp) 
Figure 3 shows that rather general hashtags such as #abst16 (“Abstimmung” = “vote”) and 
#aai (the acronym of the German name of the referendum, “Atomausstiegsinitiative”) were 
used equally often by opponents and supporters. The word “Nein” (“no”) is obviously over-
represented in the tweets of opponents, whereas “atomausstiegja” (“nuclear phase-out yes”) 
mainly appears in supporters’ tweets. It also becomes evident that opponents more frequently 
use vocabulary that describe the nuclear phase-out as blindfold in terms of being “überstürzt” 
(“rushed”), “überhastet” (“hasty”), and “chaotisch” (“chaotic”), and emphasize possible 
negative consequences like a “blackout” or the necessity to use more “kohlestrom” 
(“coalpower”), which is characterized as “dreckstrom” (“dirty electricity”). In contrast, 
supporters of a phase-out more frequently use the names of the operating nuclear power plants 
in Switzerland (“beznau” and “leibstadt”), as well as nuclear-power-related words 
(“atomstrom” and “akw”). Furthermore, words that point toward the problems of nuclear 
energy such as nuclear waste (“atommüll”) and nuclear incidents (“Fukushima”), as well as to 
the alternatives such as renewable energies (“erneuerbare”) are over-represented in tweets of 
the supporters.  
4.3 Interactions Within and Across Communities  
To examine the degree of interactions within and across the different communities, we used a 
reply network that reconstructs which of the identified users replied to whom and with what 
frequency (see Figure 4 in the Appendix). Thus, the reply network represents the active 
contributions of each community to the communicative exchange within the entire network.  
Table 2 cross-tabulates the replies sent by the users of each community to users within the 
same community (internal replies) and to users in other communities (external replies). It 
clearly shows that Swiss Twitter users did not restrict their replies to users from their own 
communities. In all the communities, the number of “external” replies strongly outweighs the 
number of internal ones, with the “Conservative Mainstream” community having the highest 
proportion of internal replies (30%) and the “Pro-Nuclear-Power” community the lowest 
(5%). In other words, depending on the community, between 70% and 95% of replies went to 
users belonging to other communities.  
The “Conservative Mainstream” community sent the most replies overall (n=406), 70% of 
which went to other communities, namely 33% to the “Energy-Environmental” community 
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and 26% to the “Green-Left” community, which were both supporting and, thus, ideologically 
different communities. A similar pattern can be observed in the 237 replies sent from the 
“Green-Left” community. Some 78% of them were external, with 43% being addressed to the 
“Conservative Mainstream” community and 21% to the “Energy-Environmental” community. 
The “Energy-Environmental” community also had a high proportion (74%) of external 
replies, with most of them being directed towards the “Conservative Mainstream” community 
(57%). In general, replies between these three communities were quite common, and they 
accounted for between 59% and 64% of all replies from these communities. 
The other communities also sent a large share of replies to different communities, thereby 
exhibiting a similar pattern. Most of these replies were directed toward the three large 
communities mentioned above, with the remainder being proportionately distributed among 
the smaller communities. The only exception was the “Green-Liberal” community, which 
very frequently replied to the “Pro-Nuclear-Power” community. But, in general, the number 
of cases was very low.  
Our findings indicate that the Swiss Twitter debate concerning the Nuclear Withdrawal 
Initiative was not limited to an individual’s community. Instead, users were actively engaging 
with members of other communities. The communication between communities is still on 
average higher over time when we compare the group of communities opposing the 
referendum with the group supporting the referendum (the groups from the prior section: see 
Figure 5). 
Insert here  
Figure 5 
Figure 5. Communication (replies) between and within communities over time  
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Insert here  
Table 2  
Cross-tabulation of internal and external replies to tweets posted by each discourse 
community 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Although analyses of public debates concerning nuclear power are well established in 
communication studies, yet previous research displays three desiderata: First, existing studies 
mostly focused on disasters such as Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, or Fukushima, and hence 
they have explored the nuclear issue in the context of risk and crisis communication. Second, 
despite their rapidly growing importance of social media in changing media landscapes 
worldwide, previous research mostly neglected the role of social media in public debates 
concerning nuclear power. Third, existing studies that examine the role of social media in 
public controversies (e.g., climate change) mostly focused on the USA, where public debate 
may exhibit different discursive patterns from those in other countries. In particular, countries 
in which public debates are of particular relevance due to the public having a say in energy 
politics via direct, national referenda have not yet been studied (see Vatter, 2009). 
In light of these desiderata, we analyze Twitter discourse in the wake of a Swiss referendum 
concerning the withdrawal from nuclear energy. We identified and characterized different 
communities debating the referendum, examined how frequently and with what content they 
communicated about the issue, and explored the interactions within and between these 
communities in order to assess in how fare the debate was polarized or connected.  
The findings of this study are particularly significant, because they run counter to the results 
of many other studies that explore social media communication on environmental issues. 
Instead of two large, ideological separated groups, like climate skeptics and advocates in the 
case of global warming, we identified seven communities based on the follower relationships, 
which are rather stable over time (e.g., Bruns, 2012). Moreover, our findings show that these 
communities differ in terms of their size, ideological position, communicative activity, and 
the way they communicate about the initiative (see Table 1, Figure 2 and 3). The 
“Conservative Mainstream” community was the largest of these communities, representing 
the majority of the conservative mainstream in the German-speaking part of Switzerland. Its 
largest challengers were the “Green-Left” community, representing the initiators of the 
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nuclear phase-out initiative, among others, and the “Energy-Environmentalist” community, 
which included activists and environmental NGOs. Three smaller communities and one 
mostly comprising representatives of the French- and Italian-speaking parts of the country 
completed the set of communities. The two communities in our network that are clearly 
geographical allocatable both supported the initiative, but for different reasons. In the case of 
the “Basle Region” community, the successful protests in the 1970ies and 1980ies against the 
construction of a nuclear power plant near Basle and the proximity to France’s oldest nuclear 
power plant in Fessenheim explain the support for the initiative. However, in case of the 
“French- and Italian-Speaking” community rather the distance to the Swiss nuclear power 
plants, which are all located in the German-speaking part of Switzerland possibly, seems to 
explain the support for the initiative (e.g., Frantál, Malý, Ouředníček, & Nemeškal, 2016). 
The activity of these communities varied over time, with peaks around the publication of 
national polls, during intense mobilization efforts and on the day of the referendum itself. 
This activity varied between communities, with larger communities displaying 
disproportionately high levels of activity. Depending on their position towards the 
referendum, the communities emphasized different content. Our analysis of the over-
represented words exchanged between supporters and opponents of the initiative revealed 
some shared nomenclature, but also some clear differences in the wording and, even though 
we cannot show this in detail, framing of the issue. 
However, although we found seven rather diverse communities, with respect to their 
communicative interactions, our results revealed an active exchange both within and, more 
importantly, across communities. Our findings revealed a lively exchange between the 
“Conservative Mainstream”, the “Green-Left”, the “Energy-Environmental”, and the “Pro-
Nuclear-Power” communities, even though they were positioned differently toward the 
initiative. Moreover, findings show that not only politicians were involved in the debate, but 
also journalists, environmental organizations, representatives from the energy sector, and 
scientists. Yet, although the Swiss Twitter debate has to be characterized as an elite discourse 
dominated by stakeholders from the German-speaking part of Switzerland, still our findings 
support the potential of Twitter to enable a pluralistic and cross-ideological debate including 
various types of actors and positions (see Tables 1 and 2). Therefore, our findings run 
contrary to analyses of social media debates on other issues in other countries. In contrast to 
Williams et al.’s (2015) analysis of Twitter communication regarding global warming, for 
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example, we do not find pronounced echo chambers. Instead, our study showed a rather 
pluralistic and internally connected debate characterized by active exchanges both within and 
across communities. Moreover, our findings confirm our earlier argumentation that due to the 
consensus democracy and multi-party system of Switzerland, Swiss political debate are in 
general less polarized, but more strongly dialogical and consensus-oriented between various 
political actors.  These findings were also confirmed in a follow-up study analyzing the 
Twitter communication during the referendum campaign of the Swiss National Energy 
Strategy 2050 in May 2017 (Vogler & Rauchfleisch, 2017). 
In sum, our study finds pronounced diversity in the communities we reconstructed. In these 
stable follower relationships (Bruns, 2012), which have sedimented over time, we find a 
broad ideological and socio-cultural spectrum. However, this does not simultaneously mean 
that the communication between these communities is fragmented; there is a considerable 
amount of communication both across communities and across different positions towards the 
nuclear withdrawal initiative. In other words, we do find the chambers, but not the echo – at 
least not in the Swiss context which differs considerably from that in the US.  
 
To conclude, our study reiterated that social media sites represent important arenas for 
political discourse concerning nuclear power. The extent to which this is due to the unique 
case of the Swiss referendum on nuclear power remains to be seen, while determining how far 
this can be generalized to public debates beyond Twitter is an issue for future research. Thus, 
more comparative research on political discourse conducted on social media is needed in 
order to explore which national, political, media, and issue-specific characteristics lead to 
which discursive patterns on social media. 
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Appendix 
 
Insert here  
Figure 1. With k-core decomposition filtered9 follower network visualized with force atlas 2 
(green: Conservative Mainstream; pink: Green-Left; grey: Energy-Environmentalist; orange: Pro-Nuclear-
Power; blue: Basle Region; dark grey: Green-Liberal; violet: French- and Italian-Speaking)10 
 
 
Insert here  
Figure 4. Reply network with the same node layout and colors as in Figure    
                                                            
9 Borge-Holthoefer, J., & Gonzlez-Bailn, S. (2017). Scale, Time, and Activity Patterns: Advanced Methods for the Analysis 
of Online Networks. In N. G. Fielding, R. M. Lee, & G. Blank (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Online Research Methods 
(pp. 259–276). London: SAGE Publications. 
10 Jacomy, M., Venturini, T., Heymann, S., & Bastian, M. (2014). ForceAtlas2, a continuous graph layout algorithm for 
handy network visualization designed for the Gephi software. PloS one, 9(6), e98679. 





Table 1  
Communities involved in the political debate on Twitter and their characterization  
Community1  Dominant 
position of 
community  
initiative2 
Yes 
share 
in 
tweets 
Relevant users in the community  Type of relevant 
users 
Language 
region  
Size 
(n/% of 
all users) 
Average 
share of the 
daily total 
volume 
Density Average 
path 
length 
E-I index 
Conservative 
Mainstream 
Opponents,  e.g., 
FDP, SVP, and 
NZZ 
19% NZZ (conservative quality newspaper), 
srfnews (mainstream Swiss public 
broadcaster), cwasi (FDP. The Liberal 
politician), FDP_Liberalen (political 
party FDP. The Liberals)  
Media, 
politicians 
German-
speaking 
Switzerland 
784  
(28%) 
29% 0.036 2.55 -0.28 
Green-Left  Supporters, e.g., 
Green Party 
84% Bglaettli (Green Party politician), 
watson_news (left online news portal), 
bastiengirod (Green Party politician and 
environmental scientist)  
Media, 
politicians  
German-
speaking 
Switzerland 
621  
(23%) 
24% 0.051 2.38 -0.14 
Energy-
Environmentalist 
Supporters, e.g., 
environmental 
organizations 
62% WWF_Schweiz (Swiss affiliation of the 
environmental organization WWF), 
greenpeace_ch (Swiss affiliation of the 
environmental organization Greenpeace) 
Civil society, 
environmental 
organizations 
German-
speaking 
Switzerland 
426  
(15%) 
18% 0.024 3.38 0.08 
Pro-Nuclear-
Power 
Opponents, e.g., 
nuclear energy 
lobbyists  
12% UrsBolt (Director of the Swiss pro-nuclear 
Energy for Humanity Foundation), 
EfH_CH (pro-nuclear Energy for 
Humanity Foundation),  
KernenergieNews (Swiss nuclear forum) 
Nuclear industry, 
experts, science 
and technology  
German-
speaking 
Switzerland 
133 
(5%) 
7% 0.078 2.49 -0.46 
Basle Region Supporters, e.g., 
Social Democratic 
Party, Green Party 
in Basle region  
79% SusanneSlo, enussbi (Social Democratic 
Party politicians), nr_mayagraf (Green 
Party politician) 
Politicians  German-
speaking 
Switzerland 
118  
(4%) 
3% 0.179 1.92 0.21 
Green-Liberal  Supporters, e.g., 
Green-Liberal 
Party 
87% Grunliberale (Green-Liberal Party), 
beatflach, huberfe (Green-Liberal Party 
politicians) 
Politicians  German-
speaking 
Switzerland 
97  
(4%) 
5% 0.223 1.96 0.31 
French- and 
Italian-Speaking 
Supporters, e.g., 
Social Democratic 
Party, Green Party, 
Romandy  
89% BR_Sprecher (spokesman for the Swiss 
Federal Council), NordmannRoger 
(Social Democratic Party politician), 
adelethorens (Green Party politician) 
Politicians French- and 
Italian-
speaking 
Switzerland 
582  
(21%) 
14% 0.032 3.04 -0.36 
Notes: 1In an analysis of the Twitter debate concerning the nuclear phase-out initiative on Twitter prior to the referendum, the Swiss research institute gfs.bern identified similar communities (SRF, 
2016, October 20); 2See also fög (2016) for the positioning of the actors. 
 
Table 2  
Cross-tabulation of internal and external replies to tweets posted by each discourse community
Community sending a reply 
Community posting a 
tweet (sender) 
Conservative 
Mainstream 
Green-Left Energy-
Environmentalist 
Pro-Nuclear-
Power 
Basle 
Region 
Green-
Liberal 
French- and 
Italian-Speaking 
Number of replies to posts 
from sender (n) 406 237 262 76 71 16 35 
Number of 
replies received 
C
om
m
un
ity
 r
ec
ei
vi
ng
 a
 r
ep
ly
 
Conservative Mainstream 30% (+2%) 43% (+15%) 57% (+29%) 33% (+5%) 46% (+18%) 56% (+28%) 51% (+23%) 426 
Green-Left 26% (+3%) 22% (-1%) 6% (-17%) 37% (+14%) 10% (-13%) 13% (-13%) 9% (-14%) 206 
Energy-Environmentalist 33% (+18%) 21% (+6%) 26% (+11%) 17% (+2%) 14% (-1%) 0% (-15%) 17% (+2%) 272 
Pro-Nuclear-Power 3% (-2%) 5% (0%) 6% (+1%) 5% (0%) 3% (-2%) 19% (+14%) 3% (-2%) 45 
Basle Region 2% (-2%) 4% (0%) 2% (-2%) 1% (-3%) 21% (+17%) 6% (+2) 0% (+4%) 25 
Green-Liberal 5% (+1) 4% (0%) 1% (-3%) 3% (-1%) 1% (-3%) 6% (+2%) 0% (-4%) 34 
French- and Italian-
Speaking 1% (-20%) 0% (-21%) 3% (-18%) 4% (-17%) 4% (-17%) 0% (-21%) 20% (-1%) 24 
Notes: The grey background represents internal replies within one community, while the white background represents external replies from other communities. χ2 (36, n = 
744) = 479.2, p < .001. In brackets the difference to the n/% of all users in the receiving community as baseline. 
